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There has been much discussion recently of  using a noitwelfarist objective function that
"targeting" in the design of social security and  seems to accord well with the common concciers
income transfers - that is, the structuring of tax  of the policy debate:  an income-based poverty
and transfer profyrams  to ensure that resources go  index.
to the poor, witl  ainimal leaks to the nonpoor.
They show that one of the key theoretical
Incentive effects force one to rule out 100  results of the welfarist literature is overturned:  if
percent marginal tax rates on the poor (implicit  it is desirable for everybody to work, the optimal
in benefit withdrawal).  With a marginal tax rate  marginal tax rate on the very poorest individuals
of 100  percent, the poor have no incentive to  is strictly negative (a marginal subsidy).
earn income. But how high or low the marginal
rate of taxation should be, and how they should  They argue that the nonwelfarist perspective
vary with income, is more complex - and  points toward lower marginal tax rates in tlhe
opinion varies widely.  lower part of the income distribution than does
the welfarist perspective.  But numerical simu1a-
Social security schemes that withdraw  tions suggest that this effect is of limited quanti-
benefits represent an extremely high effective  tative significance.
marginal tax rate; other schemes call for rcla-
tively low marginal tax rates at the bottom of the  Using conventional functional fonns and
income distribution.  Which tax-tranfer schedule  parameter values, optimal marginal tax rates on
does most to reduce poverty?  the poor are in the 60-70 percent ranlge.
The issue, say Kanbur, Keen, and Tuomala,
is one of optimal nonlinear income taxation-
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In bc"' developed and developing  countries  there has recently  been much
disc---.on of  'targeting'  In  the design of  social  security  and  income
transfers.  By this  Is  meant  the  structuring  of tax  and transfer  programmes  so
as to  ensure  that  resources  are  concentrated  on the  poor  with leakages  to the
non-poovr  minimised.  Two dimensions  of  the targeting  problem  are  of  paramount
interest.  One Is the Issue  of how best to use non-income  information  on
various contingencies - such  as  labour market  status  (unemployment,
retirement), demographic characteristics  or  region of  residence - to
differentiate  transfers.  Aspects  of this  have been analysed  by Besley  and
Kanbur (1988)  In a developing  country  context  and by Kanbur  and Keen (1989)
In a model of group-specific  linear  tax  schedules.  This work has typically
assumed income-relation  to be Infeasible  or restricted  it to take a very
simple  form, so precluding  any consideration  of the second  general issue.
This  is  the  appropriate nature and  degree of  income-relation  ('means
testing') In  determining the  extent of  an  Individual  or  household's
transfer/tax.  It Is to this  Issue  that  the  present  paper  is  addressed.
In the absence of  Incentive  effects the design of a  perfectly-targeted
non-linear  income  tax is a trivial  exercise.  Having  established  a poverty
line,  simply  give everyone  who is Initially  below it exactly  that transfer
needed  to  bring them  just  above  It.I  Such  a scheme  involves  no leakages.  But
once Incentive  effects are admitted an obvious and  familiar  difficulty
arises.  Since the scheme implies  a marginal  tax rate on those below the
poverty line of 100%, the poor have no Incentive  to earn income.  Their
rational  labour  supply  decisions  would  then  be liable  to  greatly  Increase  the
revenue  cost of alleviating  their  poverty.  Incentive  effects  may thus  force
one to rule out marginal rates on  the poor of  100%/..  The questions of
precisely  how  high  or low  those  rates  should  be,  and  of how they  should  vary
with income,  then become  considerably  more complex.  Opinion  seems to vary
widely.  On the one hand,  many social  security  schemes  observed  In practice
face the  poor  with extremely  high  effective  marginal  tax  rates (inclusive  of
1
This  assumes  that  the  resources  available  are  suffclient  to  entirely
eradicate  poverty;  a distinct  set of Issues  arises  If  they  are not.
1the taxation  Implicit  In benefit  withdrawal).  In the  UK, for instance,  while
').  Fowler reforms eliminatec  the poverty trap In the extreme form of
marginal  rates In excess  of 100% they  ar- likely  to have had the effect  of
extending  the range  of incomes  over  whilch  the  poor face  very high marginal
rates (Dilnot  and Stark (1990)).  In the US, the AFDC programme  alone has
implied marginal rates in the order of 70%. Some reform proposals, in
contrast  - such as those  seeking  to restore  a reduced  rate  band for income
tax  of the  kind implemented  In the  UK from  1978  to 1980  - call  for  relatively
low  marginal  tax rates  at the  bottom  of the distribution,  presumably  in the
hope of encouraging  the low-paid  to help themselves  by their  own efforts.
Such  fundamentally  different  strategies  for  poverty  alleviation  raise  clearly
the underlying  issue of principle:  What Is the shape of the tax-transfer
schedule  that  does  most to  reduce  poverty?
It  seems  clear  that  this  shape  Is  unlikely  to  be a simple  one. In  particular,
restricting  attention  to linear  tax schedules  would instantly  rule out of
court  much of the interesting  area  of debate.  Thus  while  in  Kanbur  and  Keen
(1989) the  analysis Is  restricted to  linear schedules  - in  order  to
concentrate  on the  use  of non-income  Information  - here  we take  the  opposite
approach  of assuming  individuals  to be identical  In all but their pre-tax
wage rates  (so  removing  any  role  for  non-income  information)  whilst  allowing
for  fully  non-linear  taxation.
The  question  being  asked  here is of course  closely  related  to that  addressed
in  the literature,  Initiated  by  Mirrlees  (1971),  on  optimal  non-linear  income
taxation.  In  this  framework,  the  issue  of work Incentives  is  tackled  directly
by modeling Individuals  as choosing  between work and leisure given the
tax-transfer  schedule  they  face.  The  government  then  chooses  a schedule  which
maximises  a social  welfare  function  based  on Individuals'  welfare,  that  Is  on
the utility they derive from their consumption-leisure  bundles.  There is,
however, a  striking and fundamental  dissonance  between this  'welfarist'
literature  and the tone of the policy debates around,  for instance,  the
Fowler reforms.  For while the welfarist  literature  takes into account the
values  of both net Income  and leisure  in the individual  welfare  functions,
the policy discussion  focusses  almost exclusively  on Incomes.  It is the
consequences  of reform  for the incomes  of the poor - the money In their
2pockets,  not something  akin  to money  metric  measures  of their  wt.lfare  - that
is  commonly debated and  analysed. Their  valuations of  u:e  associated
consumption-leisure  bundle  are typically  ignored.  Even when work Incentives
are discussed  explicitly  It Is the implications  for government  revenue  and
Individual  Incomes  that are paramount;  little  weight  Is typically  given to
such disutility  as the poor experience  from working.  We do not attempt to
explain  why this Is so,  tnough  that Is  an Interesting  and Important  question
In itself.  Rather  our  purpose  is  to take  the  concerns  of the  policy  debate  as
given  and  examine their  implications:  we  seek  to  investigate, both
qualitatively  and  quantitatively,  the  central  features  of the  non-linear  tax
schedules  that  minimise  Income-based  measures  of  poverty.
The present  analysis  is thus squarely  in the 'nor.-welfarist'  camp.  This Is
not  to say  that  the  welfarist  viewpoint  is  misplaced.  it  is simply  to suggest
that  an alternative  which  appears  more  closely  related  to the  normal  terms  of
practical  policy  formulation  and evaluation  merits  close analysis.  Despite
growing  interest  in non-welfarist  approaches  to policy  problems,  there  has
been little  discussion  of the  robustness  of welfarist  ;esults  to the  adoption
of non-welfarist  perspectives  (an  exception  being  Seade (1980)).  Thus while
our  central  aim  is to  address  the  policy  debate  on income-testing  our  results
can also be seen as contributing  to the evaluation  of the sensitivity  of
qualitative  results..  of the traditional  literatur.e  to variations  in one
fundamental  premis  es.
The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section  2 reviews  the  key qualitative
features  of the  welfarist  literature  on optimal  non-linear  Income  taxation.
Section  3 contains  our main analytical  results,  on the pattern  of marginal
rates  that  minimises  some  measure  (within  a  wide  class)  of poverty  defined  on
net incomes (or, equivalently,  consumption).  This pattern  turns out to be
qualitatively  verv different  from that which emerges  from the traditional
welfarist  approach.  These  distinctive  results  pertain,  however,  primarily  to
a neighbourhood  at the  lower  end  of the  schedule,  so that it Is important  to
investigate  the quantitative  pattern  of the schedule  over the whole  range.
For this numerical  simulation  is needed.  Section  4 presents  and discusses
such  results. Section 5  concludes, and  an  Appendix outlines both  the
derivation  of the  main  analytical  results  and the  method  of the  simulations.
32. Lessons  from  the  welfarist  literature
We assume there to be a continuum  of consumers,  each having  preferences
I  .,y) defii.ed  over consumption  x and hours worked  y, with u  >O and u <O
(subscripts  Indicating  partial  derivatives).  Individuals  differ  only In the
pre-tax  wage  n they  can  earn,  which  Is  distributed  across  the  population  with
continuous  density  f(n)  on support  ln,n].  Writing  gross  Income  as z *-  ny  and
defining
s(x,z,n)  = -u  y(xz/n)/nux(x,z/n)  >  0,  (2.1)
preferences  are  taken  to s&tisfy  the  further  restriction  that
s  < 0.  (2.2) n
This is  Assumption  B of  Mirrlees  (1971)  and  the  Agent  Monotonicity  assumption
of Seade (1982).  It Implies  that indifference  curves in consumption-gross
Income  space  become  flatter  the  higher  is  an individual's  wage  rate,  which  in
turn  ensures  that  both consumption  and  gross  ea  nings  Increase  with the  wage
rate.  Each individual  maximises  utility  by choice  of hours  worked,  solving
max  u(x,y)  subject  to  x = ny - T(ny).  (2.3)
This gives rise to consumption,  gross income  and maximised  utility  denoted
x(n),  z(n)  and  v(n)  respectively.
The  problem  of a  welfarist  government  Is  then  to
max  JW[v(n)]f(n)dn  subject  to  fT[z(n)Jf(n)dn  = R  (2.4)
where W[.l, which is taken to be concave  and increasing,  gives the social
valuation  of  utility  and  R  denotes  the  revenue  requirement. The
self-selection  constraint  imposed  by individuals'  optimisation,  implicit  in
(2.4),  is conveniently  characterised  in terms  of the  necessary  condition  for
(MZS),  which  can  be written  as
u [1-t(z)]  + u  /n = 0,  (2.5) x  y
where  t(z)  =  T'  (z)  denotes  the  marginal tax  rate at  z.
Omittirg  details  - which are  analogous  to those  given in  Appendix  A for the
analyils  of poverty minimisation  in the next section - the first order
conditions  for  the welfarist problem imply a  pattern of marginal rates
4satisfying,  for  all  n such  that  labour  supply  Is  strictly  positive. 2
p  (n)  u s
t[z(n)] =  - - x n  (2.6)
Af(n)
where  X Is the  multinlier  on the  revenue  constraint  in (2.4)  and (denoting
du/dn  by u )
n
A  (n)  J  (u  x  W  A)(1/ux)exp  (-T  nx/ux)dm)f(p)dp  (2.7)
is that  on the Incentive  compatibility  constraint.  This  latter  satisfies  the
transversality  conditions
p(n)  =  M(n)  =  o.  (2.8)
Using (2.7)  and (2.8),  it  then  also  follows  that
g(n)  >  0  for  n e (_,n),  (2.9)
the proof of  this being analogous to that which we later give for the
corresponding  result  under  poverty  minimisation.
Equations  (2.6)  to (2.9)  give  rise  to the  few  general  qualitative  conclusions
available  in  the  welfarist  framework:
(i) The  marginal  rate  of tax  should  everywhere  be  non-negative;
(ii) The marginal  rate of tax on the lowest  earner  should  be zero, so
long  as everyone  supplies  some labour  at the  optimum;  3
(iii)  The marginal  rate  of tax  on the  highest  earner  should  be zero,  so
long  as  wages In  the  population  are  boui..  JA above.
Result  (1)  is  perhaps  more  striking  than  is commonly  recognised:  while  it  may
well be optimal for the average rate of tax on the least  well-off  to be
negative,  it cannot  be desirable  to subsidise  their  earnings  at the  margin.
The limitations  of the end-point  results (li) and  (iii)  are well known:
simulations  suggest  that  zero  may  be a bad  approximation  to optimal  marginal
tax  rates  in  the tails  of the  distribution,  and if  It is  optimal  for  some  not
2
For  brevity,  we  Ignore  the  possibility of  a  corner  solution with  hours
worked  equal  to the time  endowment.
3
More  precisely, taking  n4n  the  requlrement Is  that  there  be  no  bunching at
zero  hours  (so  that  (2.6)  holds  at  all  wages  above  n).  Some  additional
restrictions on  preferences and  the  wage  distribution are  also  needed  for  the
result:  see Theorem  1 of Seade (1977).
5to work then  the  optimal  marginal  tax rate  at the  bottom  of the  distribution
can be shown to be strictly  positive (T..mala  (1990)).  Nevertheless,  these
results  continue  to colour  professional  Thinking  on Issues  of rate  structure.
The lower  end-point  result,  In particular,  has been taken  as suggestive  in
arguing  against  the  very  high  effective  rates  on the  poor  In the  U.K. (as  for
Instance  by Kay  and  King (1986)).
Here then  are  three  substantive  implications  of the  welfarist  approach.  It Is
natural to ask whether they continue  to apply when the objective is not
social welfare maximisation  but  Income poverty minimisation.  Clearly if
income  here were to be Interpreted  as equivalent  income  In the  sense  of King
(1983)  then  we have money  metric  utility  and the  welfarist  conclusions  will
go through  unaltered.  But in policy  discussions  It is the minimisation  of
poverty  defined  on measured  income  - income  actually  received  - which  often
appears to be the objective.  The purpose  of the next section is to see
whether  the  welfarist  conclusions  survive  In  such  a  non-welfarist  setting.
3.Income  poverty  minimisation:  Theory
Suppose then that the sole aim of policy Is to minimise  an Income-based
poverty  index  of the  general  additively  separable  form  analysed  by Atkinson
(1987):
P = f G[x(n),x*]f(n)dn  (3.1)
n
where  G[.  I  can  be thought  of as a generalised  poverty  gap:  non-negative  for
x <  x*,  zero  otherwise,  and  satisfying
G [x,x*]<  0 and  G  [x,x*]  >  0  V x e  (O,x*).  (3.2)
x  xx
It is  further  assumed  that
G [x,x*]  =  0.  (3.3)
x
This tspecification  precludes a  number of  widely-used  poverty indices,
Including  the  headcount  ratio  (which  would  have  very  strange  Implications  In
the  present  context).  Nevertheless,  the  class  of  measures  Is a  broad  one.
6As  In  the welfarist  framework.  Individuals  solve problem (2.3).  The
government  faces  the  same  revenue  and Incentive  compatibility  constraints.
The  only  difference  is  that  It  now  seeks  to  minimise  poverty  P.  Denoting  by  A
and  p  the  multipliers  on  the  two  constraints,  exactly  as  before,  it  Is  shown
in  the Appendix  that the first order conditions  imply,  again where
labour  supply  is  strictly  positive,  that
G s  gi(n)uxs
t[z(n)]  =  x  x  (n4
A  Xf(n)
where
g(n)  =  -|  (G  +A)(1/ux)exp(-f  (unx/nux)dm)f(p)dp  (3.5)
P
satisfies
p  (n)  =  1A  (n)  =  0.  (3.6)
g(n)  > 0  for  n  E  (n,n).  (3.7)
To  establish  (3.7)  note  first,  from  (3.5),  that  the  transversality  conditions
(3.6)  Imply  that  G +A  changes  sign  as  n Increases.  Since  G Is  strictly  convex
(by assumption)  and x(n) is increasing  in n  (as a consequence  of the
preference  restriction  (2.2)),  G  +A  Is  strictly  Increasing  in  n.  Thus  -(G  +x)
must  change  sign  only  once,  and  must  start  off  positive.  But  then  if  g were
ever  to  become  negative  it  could  not  recover  to  IA(n)=O.
The  characterisatinn  (3.4)  has  an  appealing  Interpretation.  Recalling  (2.6),
and  comparing  (3.5)  with (2.7),  note  that  the  second  term  in (3.4)  is  of
precisely  the  same  form  as the  welfarist  tax  formula  except  that  W'u  ,  the
social  marginal  valuation  of consumption,  is  replaced  by -G  ,  the  marginal
reduction  in the generalised  poverty  gap associated  with  an Increase  in
consumption.  Loosely spe;:lng,  this term can thus be  thought  of  as
corresponding  to  a welfarist  calculation  based  on  a social  valuation  of  the
form  G[v(n),x*];  measuring  poverty,  that  Is, In terms  of shortfalls  of
utility  from  some  threshold.  But  our  concern  is  with  income  poverty,  so  that
in  this  sense  it is the  first  term  In (3.4)  that  captures  the  distinctive
features  of the non-welfarist  approach.  And the  direction  in which the
concern  with  income  rather  than  utility  points  then  emerges  as  unambiguous:
it  tends  towards  lower  marginal  tax  rates  on  the  working  poor.  The  reason  Is
straightforward.  Consider  the  local  effect  of  a  compensated  reduction  in  the
7marginal tax rate at some point In the,  schedule.  This will lead to  an
Increase  in the  gross  Incomes  of those  located  at that  point,  associated  with
which wlll be an Increase  in their net Incomes  of -u  /nu  =  s. From the
y  x
welfarist perspectlve,  these consequences  fcr  Individual  behaviour are a
matter  of Indifference,  since  only  utility  matters  and that  is  unchanged.  In
terms of the present non-welfaristic  perspective,  hcwever,  the higher net
income Induced  by this lowering  of tht marginal  tax rate is desirable  In
Itself:  it  reduces  the  generallsed  poverty  gap  by the  amount  G  s appearing  In
the  first  term  of (3.4).
Do the three central welfarist results continue to apply? Result (111)
clearly  does.  Using Lun) = 0 In (3.4)  and noting  that  G [x(n),xt]  =  0  (so
long  as the  highest  earner  Is not poor),  it follows  that t[z(n))  = 0: the
marginal  rate  at the  top  of a  bounded  distribution  should  again  be zero.  This
Is as one would expect.  For In the  context  of poverty  alleviation  the only
reason  to care  about the  highest  earner  - Indeed  about  any  of the  non-poor  -
is as a source  of revenue,  and It is  well known  that in these  circumstances
one  would  want  a zero  marginal  rate  at the  top:  If  It  were  strictly  positive,
additional  revenue  couild  be extracted  by slightly  lowering  it and thereby
inducing  the  highest  earner  to  earn  additional  taxed  income.
Results  (1)  and (Ii),  in contrast,  are overturned.  Taking  limits  In (3.4)
thereby  assuming  that it is optimal  for all to work - and using the first
part  of (3.6)  one finds
t(n)  = G Ix(n),x*]s[x(L),z(n),n]/A  <  0  (3.8)
by the first condition in  (3.2) (and assuming  too that poverty Is not
entirely  eliminated).  In these  circumstances  the  marginal  rate  at the  bottom
of the gross income distribution  should be strictly  negative: if it is
optimal to have everybody  work, poverty  alleviation  calls for a marginal
subsidy  on the earnings  of the very poorest. Indeed  the conclusion  to be
drawn here is of  a  rather - re general kind than the welfarist lower
end-point  result (ii)  above:  whereas the latter  applieL.  only at the lower
extreme  of the distribution,  a set of measure  zero, (3.8)  Implies  - given
continuity  - that there  exists  an Interval  over which a negative  marginal
rate is  appropriate.
8The  rationale  for  this  result  can  be seen  ±com  Figure  1.  Suppose  that  the
initial  postiorn  is  one  In  whl-h  the  marginal  tax  rate  on the  very  poorest
household  Is  Indeed  strictly  negative.  This  initial  equilibrium  is  shown  as
point  a, an indifference  curve  of an n-household  being  tangential  to the
segment  AA  of  the  budget  constraint  implied  by  thxe  tax  system  In  force.  (For
clarity,  but inessentially,  budget  constraints  are  drawn  as If they  were
linear  in  the  relevant  range).  The  assumption  of a  negative  marginal  r  a
FIJWREI  A  BC
Gross irncornc  ()
implies  that  the slope  of AA exceeds  that  of CC, which  is the 4S  line
through  a. Consider  now  a tax  reform  that  Increases  the  marginal  rate  at  X
whilst  retaining  a itself  as  a feasible  point;  diagramatically,  the  budget
constraint  rotates  clockwise  about  a to  arrive  at  BB.  Though  not  shown,  one
can  imagine  that  the  tax  function  Is  simultaneously  amended  further  up the
distribution  so  as  to  leave  all  other  households  unaffected.  Is  this  reform
desirable?  From  the  perspective  of  social  welfare  maximisation  It  certainly
Is,  there  then  being  two  effects  pointing  In  the  same  direction.  The  first  is
that  this  poorest  hausehold  now  attains  a  higher  utility  level,  moving  to  a
point  like  1.  The  second  Is  that  tax  revenue  Increases:  since  3  lies  below  CC
9net  income falls by more  than gross. From the perspective  of  poverty
alleviation,  however,  judgement  must be suspended.  For  while  the increase  in
revenue  Is still  to  be welcomed  It Is then  Income  that  matters,  not  utility;
and the labour  supply  response  to this  reform  has the  effect  of reducing  the
poorest  h, sehold's  nat Income,  so deepening  Its  measured  poverty.  It Is the
need to balance considerations  of this kind that gives rise - when it is
optimal to induce  all to work - to negative  margii,al  rates  on the lowest
earners.
What though  If it Is optimal  for the poorest  Individuals  to be Idle?  There
are then two cases to consider.  The first is that in which  n >  0, so that
everyone  Is capable  of earning  at least  some small income.  It can then be
opt'mal  for  some  not to  work  only if the  marginal  rate  is  non-positive  at the
bottom  of the distribution.  For suppose,  to the contrary,  that the  marginal
fate  at the  bottom  Is  strictly  positive  and  that  the  poorest  Individuals  work
zero hours.  Let  z' be some level  of gross income  that  lies  within  the  range
over  which  the  marginal  rate  is  strictly  positive  and  which  is  also  less  than
nL, where  L denotes  the time  endowment.  Now consider  a reform  which leaves
the  tax schedule  at and  above  z' unchanged  while  lmposing  an average  rate  of
100%  below z'. Those who had previously  earned  less than z', including  In
particular  the  idle,  will now choose  to earn  exactly  z';  all others  will be
unaffected.  The consumption  associated  with z' can be no less than that
previously  associated  witn lower  gross incomes,  otherwise  those  initially  at
z' would have chosen to work fewer hours. Therefore  poverty cannot be
increased  by this reform.  Strict  positivity  of the marginal  rate up to z'
implies,  moreover, that the labour  supply effects  of the reform lead to
higher tax revenue.  And with this Increased  revenue  it will generally  be
possible to bring about a  strict reduction  In poverty.  Thus the initial
schedule  cannot  be optimal.  The second  and less  clear-cut  case is that In
which n =  0. The preceding  argument  then falls,  since for any strictly
positive  level  of gross  Income  there  will be a measurable  set  of individuals
unable  to earn that income  even  by working  all  of their  time  endowment.  Tax
reforms  of the kind just described,  intended  to induce  those  who can earn
some income  to do so and thereby  reduce  the revenue  cost of their  support,
will inescapably  reduce the consumption  of the very poorest and to that
extent worsen poverty. The desirability  of such a  reform.  then becomes
10unclear,  being liable to depend,  for instance,  on the form of the poverty
Index.  We have been unable  to find any  general  results  on the sign of the
optimal  marginal  rate  at the  bottom  of the  distribution  when  n =  0.
The  possibility  of  optimally negative marginal tax  rates is  certainly
conflned,  however,  to the  poorest  of the  poor.  At the  poverty  line  wage n,
deflned by x(n*) =  x*, one finds (from (3.3),(3.4)  and (3.7)) that
t(n*)  >  0.  (3.9)
Thus, invoking  continuity  once more,  there  exists  some  wage strictly  below
that required  to escape  poverty  such that all those  with higher  wages -
whether  poor  or not - face  a positive  marginal  tax  rate.
The results  of this section  thus point towards  a pattern  of marginal  tax
rates  below  the  poverty  line  that is  both complex  and  potentially  of a kind
very different  from that to which  the welfarist  tradition  has pointed.  But
there  remain  the  questions  of how  far  the  considerations  that  point  to low  or
even  negative  marginal  tax  rates  on the  very  poorest  individuals  extend  Into
the range of incomes,  and of how the poverty-minimising  rate structure  Is
affected  by the precise  location  of the  poverty  line  x  and by the  form of
the  poverty  gap  measure  G[.].  These  Issues  can  be  addressed  only  by numerical
simi'lation,  a task  to  which  we now turn.
4. Numerical  simulations
Recognising  both the difficulties  of obtaining  closed form solutions  for
optimal  non-linear  taxes  and the  potential  limitations  of end-point  results,
the  welfarist  literature  has  developed  a tradition  of numerical  simulation  (a
tradition  reviewed  In  Tuormala  (1990)).  The  original  Mirrlees  simulations,  and
many  others since, have been  carried out  for  the  benchmark case of
Cobb-Douglas  preferences
I  u =  ln(x)  +  ln(1-y)  (4.1)
(the  time  endowment  being  normallsed  at unity)  and  under  the  assumption  that
n  Is distributed  lognormally,  with the mean of ln(n) being -1 and Its
11standard  deviation  0.39. We retain  these  basic specifications.  The revenue
requirement  R will be taken  to be 10%  of gross Income,  again  a conventional
figure (intended  as a very rough  approximation  to the levels  of expenditure
on public  goods  commonly  observed).  The  essential  novelty  is the  form  of the
objective  function.  For  this  we take  a poverty  index  of the  form  developed  by
Foster,  Greer  and Thorbecke  (1984):
n=|  (x(n)  ,  xj  f(n)dn,  X>  1.  (4.2)
This has been widely  used in the  analytical  literature  on targeting  (as  for
Instance  in Besley (1990)  and Kanbur and Keen (1989)),  the parameter  a
providing  a convenient  parameterisation  of alternative  degrees of poverty
aversion.
One implication  of this specification  should be noted.  With Cobb-Douglas
preferences  (so that the marginal  rate of substitution  between  consumption
and  work  is  strictly positive at  zero  hours) and  a  lognormal wage
distribution  (so that n =  0), there are some who will work only If the
marginal  tax rate at the  bottom  of the  distribution  Is Infinitely  negative.
In  both  the  welfarist  context  and  that  of poverty  minimisation  one  would  then
expect  it  to be optimal  to  have  some  of the  population  Idle.  In the  welfarist
case,  the  optimal  marginal  rate  at the  bottom  must  then  be.strictly  positive.
As discussed in the preceding  section,  however,  when the objective  Is to
minimise  income  poverty  and n =  0 the sign  of the  optimal  marginal  rate at
the  lower  end-point  is in  general  ambiguous.  The  simulations  can  thus  provide
some  indication  of the  extent  to  which  the  argument  for  non-positive  marginal
rates  at the lower  end  when  n > 0 continues  to  exert  some  force  when Instead
the  wage  distribution  Is  not  bounded  away  from  zero.
Simulation  results  are  reported  in  Table  1  below,  which  gives  optimal  average
and marginal tax rates at various percentiles  of the wage distribution,
starting  with the  marginal  tax  rate  at the  bottom  and Including  the  point  at
which  the  assumed  poverty  line  is to be found.  Panels  (a)-(c)  all take  a=2,
and differ  in taking  successively  higher  poverty  lines.  Panel (d)  looks  at
12Table 1.  Simulation  results
Panel  (a):  F(nl)=0.31,  a=2,  X/Z=0.9
F(n)  ATR(%)  MTR(%)
0.06  -100  69
x  0.31  -3  62
0.50  12  53
0.90  29  35
0.99  29  23
F(n0)  =  0.06,  x(n 0  = 0.06.
Panel  (b):  F(n*)=0.43,  a=2,  X/Z  =0.9
F(n)  ATR(%)  MTR(%)
0.02  -100  63
x  0.43  0  54
0.50  9  53
0.90  27  34
0.99  27  17
(nO)  =  0.02,  x(no)  =  0.06.
Panel  (c):  F(n*)=0.56, o=2,  X/Z=0.9
F(n)  ATR(%)  MTR()
0.003  -87  56
0.50  8  54
x  0.56  16  48
0.90  26  34
0.99  26  17
F(nM)  =  0.003,  x(n  )  =  0.06
13Panel  (d):  Maximin  (a=c),  X/Z=O.9
F(n)  ATR(%)  MTR(%)
0.16  -100  73
0.50  17  S3
0.90  32  35
0.99  32  26
F(n  )  =  0.16, x(n )  =  0.07
Notes: (a)  n  denotes  the wage  below  which individuals  choose  not  to work. 0
(b)  X/Z denotes  the ratio  of aggregate  consumption  to  aggregate
output.
(c)  ATR (HTR)  denotes  the average  (marginal)  tax rate.
the  maximin  case,  4 which  corresponds  to =o.
Several  features  of these  results  are  noteworthy.  First,  and as anticipated,
it is always  optimal  to have some of the  poorest  Individuals  idle.  Second,
the marginal  rate on the lowest  gross income  - which,  as just noted, is
ambiguous  in  sign  when  n = 0 - emerges  as  very  strongly  positive:  not only  is
it not negative,  it is not even low. Third,  marginal tax rates decline
monotonically  from the  poorest  to the  richest  individuals.  This is in marked
contrast  to the  welfarist  tradition,  in  which  the  pattern  of optimal  marginal
rates typically  has a mild inverse-U  shape.  Indeed  it Is notable  that the
poverty-minimising  schedules  - unlike  those  of Mirrlees  (1971)-  could  not  be
described  as approximately  linear.  This confirms  our earlier  remarks  on the
importance  of relaxing  non-linearity,  and, moreover,  tends to weaken the
common  argument  that  - given  its  administrative  advantages  - the  social  loss
through  restricting  oneself  to linear  Income  taxes Is likely  to be small.
Fourth,  comparing  panels  (a)  to (c),  increases  in the  poverty  line  lead  to a
4Since  the  poorest  Individuals do  not  work  at  the  optimum  for  either  the
welfarist  or  poverty  minimisation  problems,  'maximin'  here  refers
simultaneously  to both Income  and utility.
14reduction In  optimal marginal rates at  and  below  the  poverty line.
Intuitively,  the explanation  for this appears  to be that the case for low
marginai  rates in order to encourage  those  at or near the poverty  line to
move  over It becomes  stronger  as the  poverty  line  moves  Into  denser  parts  of
the  distribution.  Flfth,  comparing  panel (d)  with the  rest,  Increases  In the
extent  of aversion  to Inequality  tend  to Increase  marginal  rates  on the  poor.
This Is perhaps  as would be expected,  since the  greater  one's  concern  with
poverty  alleviation  the more attractive  schemes  approaching  minimum  Income
guarantees  are likely  to  be.
But perhaps the most Important  feature  of the results  Is the finding  of
marginal  tax rates on the  poor that  are invariably  rather  high (bearing  in
mind  the  fairly  minimal  revenue  requirement).  In  most  cases  marginal  rates  on
the bulk of the poor exceed  60%, and In all cases they exceed  50%. These
rates  are somewhat  lower  than  those  (of  around  80 to  90%)  found  by Garfinkel,
Moreland  and  Sadka (1982)  for  the  welfarist  case.  To that  extent  the  informal
argument following equation (3.4) that the non-welfarist  perspective  is
likely  to point  towards  somewhat  lower  marginal  rates  on the  working  poor Is
borne  out. Nevertheless,  the case  for low  marginal  tax  rates  falls  to leave
as discernible  a trace in the  simulations  as one might  have expected.  Even
with  the  relatively  elastic  labour  supply  responses  Implicit  In Cobb-Douglas
preferences,  a stronger  mark Is left by the case for high marginal  rates
associated  with the  unattainable  ideal  of perfect  targeting  described  at the
outset.
5. Conclusion
The  central  thrust  of the  present  non-welfarist  analysis  is to  strengthen  the
case for lower marginal tax rates on the poor. But not by much. This
alternative  perspective  has  been  shown  to  overturn  the  lower  end-point  result
of the traditional  literature:  when everybody  works at the optimum, the
minimisation  of  income poverty requires that the  lowest  earner face a
strictly  negative  marginal  tax rate and, by continuity,  that the marginal
rates  on the  not-quite-so-poor  also  be negative.  However,  we have  also seen
that  the  optinal  marginal  tax  rate  at the  poverty  line  Is  strictly  positive.
15Putting  these  two  observations  together  points  to  a potentially  complex  rate
structure,  the shape  of which  can  only  be fleshed  out by numerical  methods.
These  suggest  optimal  marginal  rates  on the  poor that  are  only  a little  lower
than  is typical  In a welfarist  framework.  But  while  the  rates  we calculate  -
unlike  those  we observe  - are  nowhere  near 100%,  they  are not close  to zero
elther.  Taking  conventional  functional  forms  and  parameter  values,  the  Income
poverty  minimising  marginal  tax  rates  on the  poor  are In  the  order  of 60-70%.
16APPENDIX
A. Derivation  of (3.4)  and (3.5)
Substituting for  x  from  the  budget  constraint, differentiation of
u(x(n),y(n)]  with respect  to  n  gives
du/dn  =  u (1-t)y  +  {u  (1-t)n  +  u }dy/dn.  (A.1)
Using the first  order  condition  (2.3),  Individual  optimisation  thus implies
the  envelope  condition
du/dn  =  -yu  /n  a  u (x,y,n).  (A.2)
To simplify  the optimisation,  we take u and y to be the objects  of choice.
Inverting  direct  utility  then  gives  x = h(u,y),  where
h  = -u  /u,  h  = 1/u.  (A.3)
y  y  x  u  x
Defining  too  g(u,y,n)  =  u [h(u,y),y,n],  it is  straightforward  to  check  that
n
gv=  -nu s  ,  g  =  u/u.  (A.4)
The  optimum  is then  characterised  by a pair  of functions  u(n) and  y(n)  which
minimise  the poverty index  subject  to the Incentive  compatibilty  condition
du/dn  =  g  and the overall  resource  constraint.  Introducing  multipliers  X  and
p(n) for  these  constraints  and  integrating  by parts,  the  Lagrangean  becomes
L =  n (t-G(x,x*)  + ACny  - x)]f(n)  - ,'u  - pg)  dn
+  (tn)u(n)  - W(n)u(n).  (A.5)
Differentiating  with respect  to  u and  y gives  the  first  order  conditions:
L  =  -lG  +  M]h  f(n) - g'  - (g±(n)u  /u )  =  0  (A.6)
L  =  [-G  h  +  X(n-h  )]f(n)  +  g(n)nu s  =  0.  (A.7)
y  X y  y  x  n
Dividing  (A.7)  by Af and  rearranging,  one  finds
i - (h  /n) =  (G  h /Xn)  - (puxs  /Af).  (A.8) y  x  y  xIn
Using (2.3)  and the  first  part  of (A.3),  (A.8)  becomes  (3.4).  Solving  (A.6),
using'  (3.6),  gives (3.5).
17B. Outline  of the  computation  method
For an additively  separable  utility  function,  as in (4.1),  u  =  0 and so
(A.6)  becomes
-[G  +  A]f(n)/ux  - A'  (B.1)
x 
Using (A.9),  the  solution  of (B.1)  is
n
p(n)  = - (Gx+A)(l/ux)f(p)dp.  (B.2)
Equation  (A.7)  is  now
[-G  h  +  A(n-h  )lf(n)  +  #A(n)(u  +yu  )/n  =  0  (B.3) x  y  y  Y  yY
which  can  be  written  as
n  2rf(n) - | lG  +  AM(/Au  =f(p)dp  =  (B.4)
n
where r =  [(G  u  /Anu )+ 1 +(u  /nu  )]/(u +  yu ). Differentiating  (B.4)  gives
the  differential  equation
-r[2 + (nf'/f)]/n  +  [G  /Au )  +  (1/u  )]'n  ; x < x
dr/dn =  x  x  x  (B.5)
-r[2 +  (nf'/f)]/n  +  1/u  n2 ;  x > x*.
x
The formulae  (B.5)  and (A.2)  form  a  pair  of non-linear  differential  equations
in u and r. They provide  the solution  to our problem,  together  with the
conditions  (2.5)  and  ji(n)  =  0 (rn 2f 4  0 as  n 4  ).
A  fourth  order  Runge-Kutta method  is  used  to  solve  the  non-linear
differential  equation  system (B.5)  and (A.2).  Instead  of solving  for A, a
value is assumed  for it. It can be shown that there  is a critical  n0 such
that
y(n)  =  0 for  n s no  (B.6)
y(n) >  0 for  n > n  .
Trial  and  error  is  used  to  find  a  value  of no  which  enables  us to sa.isfy  the
condition  y(n  )  =  0. From (B.4)  we can  solve  x(n  )  using  the  Newton  method.
When A is given  and x(n  )  is solved,  the Integration  of (B.5)  and (A.2)  can
be started.  When u  1+  and r1 1 are obtained  (i referring  to an iteration
cycle),  the  new  values  for  y and  x are calculated  from (B.5)  and  the  utility
function  by using  the  Newton  method.
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